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Measures to decrease contact between persons dur-
ing an influenza pandemic have been included in pandem-
ic response plans. We used stochastic simulation models
to explore the effects of school closings, voluntary confine-
ments of ill persons and their household contacts, and
reductions in contacts among long-term care facility (LTCF)
residents on pandemic-related illness and deaths. Our find-
ings suggest that school closings would not have a sub-
stantial effect on pandemic-related outcomes in the
absence of measures to reduce out-of-school contacts.
However, if persons with influenzalike symptoms and their
household contacts were encouraged to stay home, then
rates of illness and death might be reduced by ≈50%. By
preventing ill LTCF residents from making contact with
other residents, illness and deaths in this vulnerable popu-
lation might be reduced by ≈60%. Restricting the activities
of infected persons early in a pandemic could decrease the
pandemic’s health effects.
T
hree influenza pandemics have occurred during the
20th century (in 1918, 1957, and 1968), and another
pandemic is inevitable (1). The requirements for a pan-
demic virus include the existence of a new influenza A
hemagglutinin for which there is little immunity, the abili-
ty of this strain to infect humans efficiently, and person-to-
person transmission. Such viruses are likely to arise in
densely populated agricultural communities where contact
between humans and birds or pigs are close and persistent
(2). In 1997, a highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1)
virus was transmitted from live poultry to humans in Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, People’s Republic of
China, killing 6 of 18 infected persons (3). From
December 2003 through June 6, 2006, the World Health
Organization confirmed 225 human cases and 128 deaths
associated with influenza A (H5N1) infections in humans
(4), and in October 2005, influenza A (H5N1) infections
among birds were identified for the first time in Europe.
Currently circulating influenza A(H5N1) viruses appear to
infrequently infect humans, and person-to-person trans-
mission, if it occurs, is certainly not efficient. However,
international health officials are concerned that, as human
exposure to such viruses increases, so does the possibility
that a pandemic virus might appear.
The next influenza pandemic in the United States
could result in 89,000 to 207,000 deaths, 314,000 to
734,000 hospitalizations, and 18 to 42 million outpatient
visits, with a direct economic effect between US $71 and
$166 billion, according to 1 set of estimates (5). Others
have described the possible effects of vaccine and antiviral
interventions. One study estimated that vaccinating 60% of
the population would be necessary to achieve optimal cost
benefits, assuming that development and mass production
of a vaccine would require 6–8 months after the pandemic
virus was characterized (5). Longini et al. (6) estimated the
effectiveness of rapid targeted antiviral prophylaxis of per-
sons early in a pandemic by using epidemic stochastic sim-
ulations. They found that if the next pandemic virus had a
similar virulence to that of the 1957–58 pandemic virus,
then delivering prophylaxis to 80% of exposed persons for
up to 8 weeks could reduce attack rates by 2%–33% and
death rates by 0.04–0.58/1,000 persons. However, such a
strategy would require a stockpile of 1.9 billion doses of
antiviral agents, which exceeds the current production
capacity for these drugs for at least the next 5 years.
In the absence of adequate supplies of vaccines and
antiviral agents, at least during the first wave of an influen-
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USA; and §Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USAza pandemic, public health officials should consider using
interventions designed to reduce the number of contacts
between infected or exposed persons and susceptible per-
sons. The US Department of Health and Human Services
Influenza Pandemic Plan discusses several possible con-
tainment strategies, including those directed to single per-
sons or entire communities (7). We used new stochastic
simulation models to estimate the effects of several inter-
ventions of this kind. These models represented the spread
of a pandemic in an urban US community, allowing for
contacts in different settings (or mixing groups), including
households, daycare centers, schools, workplaces and
long-term care facilities (LTCFs). By using the age distri-
bution of the US population (8), we placed each person in
the community in a stratum, defined by age group and (if
>65 years of age) by residence in the community or in an
LTCF. Person-to-person transmission probabilities
depended on the daily duration of contacts. Contact rates
and their duration varied by each person’s stratum and
mixing groups. By using these models to simulate an
influenza pandemic, we estimated the effects of school
closings, home confinement of ill persons (i.e., isolation)
or their household contacts (i.e., quarantine), and reduction
of contacts among residents of LTCFs on overall illness
attack rates, hospitalization rates, and mortality rates.
Materials and Methods
Simulation Model
We simulated an influenza outbreak in a small urban
US community. The simulation model used data from the
Asian influenza A (H2N2) pandemic in 1957–58 (6) and
from studies on US influenza-related excess rates of hospi-
talizations and death (9–11). The simulation process begins
with the generation of a community of households, where
the distributions of sizes of the households and ages of the
household members follow the 2000 US Census. Every
person in the community belongs to 1 of 5 age-dependent
strata: preschool children (ages birth–4 years), school-
children (ages 5–18 years), adults (ages 19–64 years), sen-
iors (ages >65 years) living at home, and seniors (ages >65
years) living in an LTCF. In addition, each person belongs
to >1 mixing groups, according to his or her stratum:
households, daycare centers, schools, workplaces, LTCFs,
and the community. The mixing matrix is presented as
Table 1.
On any given day, a susceptible person, A, makes con-
tacts with other persons that may lead him or her to
become infected. These contacts take place in each of A’s
mixing groups. The probability that person A becomes
infected depends on the following input parameters: 1) the
number of different persons with whom person A has con-
tact in each mixing group, 2) the total duration, in minutes,
of all the contacts with each of these persons, and 3) the
per-minute rates of infection transmission if the contacted
person is infectious. The number and duration of contacts
may be different on weekdays and weekend days. The val-
ues of the parameters that were used in this study are pre-
sented in the online Supplemental Materials Appendix
(available at http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/4/581.
htm). Once person A becomes infected, he or she under-
goes a latent period, followed by a period in which he or
she is infectious. The mean length of the latent and infec-
tious periods are input parameters.
This model has 3 new features that are not shared by
the commonly used simulation models (such as the model
in [6]) for transmission of influenza: 1) the probability of
transmission depends on the total duration of all contacts
between 2 persons, rather than on the number of times they
make a contact, 2) the transmission parameters do not
depend on the population size, and 3) different contact
parameters can be specified for weekdays and weekend
days. Technical details of the simulation model are pre-
sented in the Supplemental Materials Appendix. The basic
reproductive number (R0) for this model is 2.7. This value
is within the range (2.0–3.0) estimated by Mills et al. (12)
for the 1918 influenza pandemic.
Interventions
The interventions we examined in this simulation
study were school closings, confinement of ill persons and
their household contacts to their homes, and reduction in
contact rates among residents of LTCFs. Interventions
were implemented at the start of the outbreak.
School Closings
When this intervention was implemented, schools
closed when the prevalence of illness among children in
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15%, or 20% in the simulations. A school remained closed
for a predetermined period (7, 14, or 21 days). On week-
days, household and community contact parameters of
children whose school was closed were assigned their
weekend levels; their contacts with other children who
continued to attend school and with working adults did not
change.
Confinement to Home
When this intervention was implemented, a given
fraction of households were assumed to comply. If a
household complied, then all of its members followed the
confinement rules unless they had been previously ill and
had recovered. We considered 2 types of confinement: ill
persons only, and ill persons and all the members of the
same household. Confinement began after a given number
of days of illness (1, 2, or 3 days) and did not depend on
the severity of illness. If symptoms were severe, then the
person reduced his or her duration of contacts with other
household members by 50%.
When a person was confined on a weekday (because
of his or her illness or illness of another household mem-
ber) and did not withdraw due to severe symptoms, then
the duration of contacts with household members who con-
tinued to go to school or work did not change. Durations of
contacts with household members who stayed at home and
were not withdrawn were the same as on a weekend day.
When ill persons were confined, they returned to
school or work 1 day after their illness ended. When ill
persons and other household members were confined, a
person returned to school or to work 1 day after his or her
illness ended (even if other ill persons remained in the
household). A person who did not become ill returned to
school or work on the third day after the last day of illness
of any household member (because the length of the
latent/incubation period was assumed to be 2 days).
Reduction of Contacts in LTCFs
We examined the effects of 2 interventions on LTCF
residents: reduction in duration of contacts with other res-
idents who were ill, and reduction in duration of contacts
with visiting family members. Contacts with LTCF staff
did not change.
Effectiveness of Interventions
We first ran a set of 200 simulations using the baseline
settings for all the parameters, without any interventions
(online Supplemental Materials Appendix). The average
rates for the 3 outcomes of interest—overall illness rate,
hospitalization rate, and death rate—were calculated for
200 simulations and used as baseline rates. For each inter-
vention, we ran a set of 200 simulations and used the aver-
ages of these simulations as estimates of the expected rates
under this intervention. The effectiveness of each interven-
tion was defined as follows:
Effectiveness = [(baseline rate) – (rate with interven-
tion)]/baseline rate
Sensitivity Analysis
We performed a sensitivity analysis to assess the
robustness of our findings regarding the effectiveness of
the 3 modeled interventions. In common with all simula-
tion studies, our findings depended on several parameters
for which we have estimated values that we believe are
reasonable starting points. These values included baseline
contact rates, the probability of illness given infection, the
relative infectiousness of an infected person without
influenza symptoms, the probability of withdrawal to
home because of severe symptoms, and the reduction in
contact rates due to severe symptoms. We varied the val-
ues of these parameters and examined the effects of these
changes on estimates of the effectiveness of school clos-
ings and confining ill persons to their homes.
Results
Baseline Rates
Based on the 200 simulations conducted with the
baseline values of the pandemic parameters, the baseline
rate of illness was 32.1%, (95% confidence interval [CI]
31.2%–32.9%), the baseline rate of hospitalization was
196.9/100,000 (95% CI 183.2–210.6) and the baseline rate
of death was 63.4/100,000 (95% CI 56.2–70.6). These
results were based on the assumption that the illness rates
would be similar to their values in the 1957 influenza
pandemic.
School Closings
Two parameters affected the effectiveness of school
closings: the percentage of ill schoolchildren required to
close a school and the number of days the school remained
closed. The effectiveness of the intervention varied as a
function of the percentage of ill persons required for clos-
ing a school and the duration of the closure (Figure 1). For
example, if each school were closed for 7 days when the
proportion of ill children exceeded 10%, then the overall
illness rate was 0.288 (95% CI 0.278–0.297). The baseline
illness rate was 0.321; therefore, the effectiveness of this
intervention was (0.321–0.288)/0.321 = 0.103 (95% CI
0.075–0.131). As expected, effectiveness usually
decreased as the percentage of ill children required to close
a school increased. The effect of the length of closure was
less clear (Figure 2). When schools were closed, transmis-
sion in households and in the community increased; thus,
school closings could increase death and illness rates in
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for school closing was 10%, then closing schools for 14
days had the largest effect on hospitalization rates, com-
pared with closings of 7 or 21 days. However, when the
rate for closing was 20%, then closing schools for 14 days
had a smaller effect on hospitalization rates than closing
for 7 or 21 days.
Confinement to Home
In our models, confinement to home took place after a
person showed symptoms of influenza. A delay of 1, 2, or
3 days occurred between onset of symptoms (which coin-
cided with the onset of infection) and the beginning of the
confinement period. This delay and the proportion of
households that complied with the confinement rules
affected the effectiveness of the intervention. Figure 2
presents the effectiveness of these interventions as a func-
tion of the percentage of households that comply (between
zero and 80%) for a delay of 2 days. As expected, effec-
tiveness usually increased with the compliance percentage.
Confining the ill persons and their household members
was more effective than confining the ill persons only. For
example, given a delay of 2 days and 60% compliance, the
effectiveness of these interventions on illness rates was
0.33 for confining the ill only and 0.80 for confining ill
persons and their household members. Effectiveness
decreased when the length of the delay was increased.
Reducing Contacts in LTCFs
Reducing contacts with ill residents of LTCFs
decreased the rates of illness, hospitalization, and death for
LTCF residents by >50% (Table 2). Reducing contacts also
decreased the rates of hospitalization and death in the gen-
eral population by up to 14% and 24%, respectively.
Effect of Intervention on Dynamics of the Pandemic
Figure 3 presents the dynamics of the pandemic
(A) without any intervention, (B) when schools are closed
for 14 days as the proportion of ill children exceed 10%,
and (C) when ill persons and all their household contacts
are confined after the second day of illness of the index
case-patient and compliance is 40%. We see that these
interventions do not affect the time to the peak of the pan-
demic (around week 5). The rate of decline following the
peak does not change under confinement to home, while it
slightly decreases under school closing.
Sensitivity Analysis
The value of the basic reproductive number (R0) for
the baseline setting of our parameters is 2.7. Because this
value is higher than values used in recent simulation stud-
ies (13,14), we evaluated the effectiveness of the interven-
tions under smaller values of R0. We found that reducing
R0 resulted in an increase in the effectiveness of confine-
ment to home and a decrease in the effectiveness of school
closings. Thus, our findings regarding the effectiveness of
confinement and the lack of effectiveness of school clos-
ings remain valid for smaller values of R0. The results of
additional sensitivity analyses were as follows.
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Figure 1. Estimated effectiveness of closing schools on illness (A),
hospitalization (B), and death (C) rates during a simulated pan-
demic.School Closings
The most important parameters related to the effec-
tiveness of school closings are those that underlie the con-
tacts between children while they are in school. In our
simulations we assumed that on a school day each child
makes contact with 10 other schoolchildren, each contact
lasting 120 minutes (see section D.1.a in the online
Supplemental Materials Appendix). Some of these con-
tacts may be concurrent. To examine the effect of changing
each child’s exposure to other schoolchildren on the effec-
tiveness of school closures, we increased and decreased
the baseline duration of 120 minutes by 50%. Table 3
shows the effectiveness of closing schools for 14 days for
the 3 baseline values of duration of school contact. As we
see, longer or shorter durations of contact while schools
are open do not result in substantial changes in the effec-
tiveness of school closings.
Confinement to Home
We varied the values of several parameters in the
baseline model and examined the effects these changes had
on estimates of the effectiveness of confinement of ill per-
sons to their homes (Table 4). We assumed that 40% of ill
persons without severe symptoms were confined to home
within 2 days of symptom onset. When the fraction of
infected persons who developed symptoms was increased
from 0.67 to 0.93, then the illness rate without an interven-
tion (i.e., at the baseline level) changed only from 0.333 to
0.319, while implementation of the intervention changed
this rate from 0.272 to 0.242. Thus, the effectiveness of
this intervention increased from 0.183 to 0.241. The alter-
native values we used in Table 2 modeled a more severe
pandemic than the pandemic modeled with the baseline
initial values.
Discussion
The continuing epizootic of influenza A (H5N1)
among birds in Asia and Europe has raised concerns that
the likelihood of an influenza pandemic may be increasing.
Shortages in the supply of neuraminidase inhibitors, the
antiviral agents most likely to be effective against a pan-
demic influenza strain, and the months needed from the
isolation of a pandemic strain until the availability of vac-
cine suggest that reducing contact rates between infected
and uninfected persons will represent one of the few sets
of interventions that can be rapidly implemented. We used
a stochastic simulation model to estimate the effectiveness
of several interventions that could reduce contact rates on
pandemic-related outcomes.
The Pandemic Influenza Strategic Plan and Public
Health Guidance for State and Local Partners prepared by
the US Department of Health and Human Services was
released on November 2, 2005 (7). This plan discusses the
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Figure 2. Estimated effectiveness of confinement to home 2 days
after onset of respiratory symptoms on illness (A), hospitalization
(B), and death (C) rates during a simulated pandemic.use of individual-level (e.g., isolation and quarantine) and
community-level (e.g., school closings) containment
measures. Our study considered possible interventions of
both kinds, including early identification and confinement
of case-patients and their household contacts, limiting vis-
its to LTCFs, and closing of schools.
Our findings suggest that closing schools would result
in relatively small reductions in morbidity and mortality
rates during a pandemic. For example, when schools were
closed when >10% of children had influenza symptoms
and remained closed for 14 days, the rates of illness, hos-
pitalization, and death decreased from the baseline rates of
32.1%, 197/100,000, and 63/100,000 to 26.5%, 170/
100,000, and 54/100,000, respectively. Thus, the effective-
ness of school closings was ≈14%–18%. When we
increased the threshold of illness incidence required for
school closing to 20%, then these rates were 31.9%,
203/100,000, and 69/100,000, respectively. These mild
decreases in the rates of illness and death after school clo-
sures are explained by the fact that in our models, children
whose schools were closed were more likely to increase
their contacts with other groups. The attack rate of 62%
that we used for school-age children may be considered
high. However, if the attack rate were reduced, school
closings would have an even smaller effect. Our results do
not contradict recent findings that vaccination of school-
children could be effective in controlling transmission dur-
ing a seasonal influenza epidemic (15). Vaccination of
children reduces their chances of infection and of transmit-
ting infection to household and community contacts,
whereas closing schools may not decrease the likelihood of
infection substantially and could increase the probability
that an infected child will infect household and communi-
ty contacts (14).
The effect of school closings on overall illness rates in
an influenza pandemic has been estimated in other recent
simulation studies. Germann et al. (16) modeled the effect
of a pandemic on the entire US population. They found
that for R0>1.9, closing of schools without any additional
interventions had limited effectiveness. On the other hand,
for R0<1.6, school closings reduced the extent of illness.
Carrat et al. (17), by using a simulation model for the
spread of influenza in a community, found school closings
to be effective. We believe that these inconsistencies in the
reported effects of school closings depend on the details of
the various simulation models, especially on the way the
community is affected by school closing in terms of
increased contact rates of schoolchildren when their school
is closed.
Our simulations predict that it might be possible to
decrease illness and death rates by as much as 50% by
reducing the contact rates of all ill persons. However,
achieving this level of effectiveness would require per-
suading 60% of those with symptoms to withdraw to their
homes and confine themselves. Simulation studies by
Longini et al. (13) and Ferguson et al. (14) found that quar-
antine, when used in conjunction with vaccines and antivi-
ral agents, would be effective in containing an influenza
pandemic in Southeast Asia. One should remember that the
effectiveness of any behavioral/social intervention may
vary across cultures.
Residents of LTCFs are likely to be at high risk for
serious pandemic-related illness and death. We found that
by limiting contacts of ill residents, illness and death may
be reduced among other residents. These are notable find-
ings, as this vulnerable population responds poorly to sea-
sonal influenza vaccination, and they are unlikely to
receive the limited quantities of pandemic vaccine when it
first becomes available.
The effectiveness of any particular intervention
designed to reduce contact rates depends on the initial val-
ues selected for the parameters affecting influenza trans-
mission (e.g., contact durations, probability of withdrawal
due to severe symptoms), and a limitation of our study is
RESEARCH
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designed to obtain reliable estimates of these parameters
during seasonal, interpandemic influenza outbreaks should
be a high priority. However, the major findings of this
study seem to be robust, given a range of realistic values
for the parameters we used. The target attack rates we used
to calibrate the contact parameters (provided in the
Supplemental Materials Appendix) are high, but lowering
these attack rates should not have a major effect on our
findings, because both the pre- and postintervention inci-
dence rates would decrease concomitantly.
We did not make formal estimates of the economic
costs and benefits of the interventions we examined.
However, some likely consequences of school closings
may be considered, given current childcare practices.
Obviously, the longer the duration of school closure, the
more costly the consequences as working parents either
have to take time off work to supervise children or pay for
somebody else to care for them. If a large number of
school days are lost, school districts might consider
extending the school year, which would incur additional
costs, although the conditions would be expected to vary
greatly between school districts. These increased costs
would have to be weighed against the limited predicted
effectiveness of this intervention. Encouraging the volun-
tary withdrawal of ill persons appears to be a more effec-
tive strategy than school closings in reducing the impact of
a pandemic, and it may represent a relatively inexpensive
intervention. However, researchers have found that US
workers routinely miss <1 day of work after reporting
onset of influenzalike illness (18). Encouraging longer
durations of work loss could decrease compliance with
self-isolation and increase the economic cost per case
avoided. Home quarantine of the immediate family mem-
bers of an ill person would likely increase the costs per
case averted. For example, during the quarantine efforts
related to the severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak
in Toronto (19), many families found it too expensive
to rigidly comply with a household-level quarantine of
≥7 days.
Our stochastic simulation model has several strengths.
The model considers the length of time 2 persons are in
contact, in addition to the total number of contacts. The
model parameters we used are not related to the size of the
simulated population, unlike previous models (6). We
repeated the simulations conducted for this study with a
population twice as large as the original population and the
same input parameters. The resulting rates were almost
unchanged, so the differences can be attributed to the ran-
dom effects associated with these simulations. The weak-
nesses of our present model are that it requires many input
parameters and that it does not include the effects of antivi-
ral medications. Our model allows for estimating vaccine
effects for susceptibility and infectiousness; however, this
option was not used in the present study. 
On February 1, 2007, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention issued an Interim Pre-Pandemic Planning
Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Mitigation in the United States (20). This document
recommends several nonpharmaceutical interventions
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Figure 3. Dynamics of the influenza pandemic. Case 1: no inter-
ventions. Case 2: schools are closed for 14 days when prevalence
reaches 10%. Case 3: ill persons and all their household contacts
are confined to their homes after the second day of illness of the
index case-patient, and the compliance rate is 40%. A) illness; B)
hospitalizations, C) deaths.during a severe pandemic, including isolation of persons
with confirmed or probable influenza, voluntary home
quarantine of members of households with confirmed
cases, dismissal of students from schools and school-based
activities, and closure of childcare programs. During a
pandemic with a severity index of 4 or 5 (defined as a case
fatality rate of >1%), this new guidance recommends not
only school dismissals of ≤12 weeks but also measures to
protect children from being exposed or exposing others to
the pandemic virus via reduction of their out-of-school
social contacts and community mixing. In this article, we
assessed the effectiveness of school closures of 1–3 weeks
duration after school absenteeism rates reached high lev-
els. We assumed that children dismissed from schools
would increase their out-of-school contacts. These
assumptions reduced the effectiveness of school closures
in our model. In future work, we will explore the effective-
ness of early dismissal of students from schools, together
with changes in out-of-school contacts, and other interven-
tions using our model.
In summary, if persons who suspect they are infected
with pandemic influenza virus were to withdraw to their
homes quickly, the rates of illness and death associated
with a pandemic may be substantially reduced. The with-
drawal of all household contacts may further reduce rates
of illness and death, but this additional intervention is
likely to be relatively costly and difficult to implement.
Restricting the movement of ill LTCF residents will be
beneficial in reducing their adverse health outcomes.
Before early and rapid implementation of such interven-
tions during a pandemic is feasible, the public will need to
be educated about the early symptoms of influenza and
measures developed to increase the social acceptability of
self-isolation when ill.
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